This paper analyzes the provision of international public goods by sovereign democracies.
Introduction
Cross border externalities and transnational public goods lead to ine¢ ciencies and collective action failure when countries set their policies noncooperatively. In the absence of overarching political institutions, observers often call for greater coordination between national policy makers to internalize these externalities. However, despite the multiplication of international negotiations and summits, the supposed gains from international cooperation have arguably not fully materialized. Many global public goods such as the reduction of greenhouse gas emission, political asylum, disease eradication, …sh stocks, or …scal stimulus are still underprovided.
Since Coase (1960) , economists have invoked transaction costs of various sorts to explain the inability of bargaining parties to reach mutually bene…cial arrangements. 1 This strand of literature focuses on the bargaining process and does not take into account the speci…cities of the decision process within each country. Others have argued that international policy coordination can exacerbate ine¢ ciencies in national politics. 2 This paper assumes away any ine¢ ciencies in national politics or in the bargaining process, and focuses instead on the interaction between elections at the national level and cooperation at the international level.
In modern democracies, most decision are taken not by the voters, but by political representatives appointed by the voters. As Persson and Tabellini (1992) …rst pointed out, even if one abstracts away from political agency issues, this distinction has important consequences, because sophisticated voters can use elections as a strategic delegation mechanism. Several papers have shown that once voters' incentives are taken into account, the impact of international cooperation on public good provision is ambiguous (Segendor¤ 1998 , Gradstein 2004 , Buchholz et al. 2005, Kempf and Rossignol 2013) . On the one hand, cooperation helps national policy makers internalize cross-border spillovers. This direct e¤ect increases public good provision. On the other hand, more public good requires greater contributions from 1 Among others, commitment and enforcement problems (Williamson 1985 , North 1990 , or Acemoglu 2003 or imperfect information (Mailath and Postlewaite 1990, Harstad 2007 ) can lead to ine¢ ciencies. 2 International policy coordination can exacerbate political agency problems (Brennan and Buchanan 1980 , Buchanan and Faith 1987 , Tabellini 1990 , Persson and Tabellini 1995) or dynamic commitment problems between voters and politicians (Rogo¤ 1985 , Kehoe 1989 ).
participating countries. Therefore, cooperation induce strategic voters to elect representatives who care less about the public good, so as to decrease their relative contribution. This electoral e¤ect decreases public good provision. In this paper, we determine the main drivers of the magnitude of this electoral e¤ect, and characterize the conditions under which it only mitigates, or completely o¤sets the direct e¤ect of cooperation.
We consider a global public good model with two countries populated by a continuum of heterogeneous voters. The preferences of a given voter or candidate are characterized by a type that determines her trade-o¤ between public good and private good consumption.
Alternatively, this type can be interpreted as her "tax price"of the public good. Countries'
contributions are determined by a two-stage game. In the …rst stage-the electoral stageeach country elects its representative by majority rule. In the second stage-the policymaking stage-the elected representatives choose, cooperatively or noncooperatively, their contributions to the global public good. In the cooperative scenario, the representatives implement the generalized Nash bargaining solution with the noncooperative outcome as the bargaining default.
The main result is that whether cooperation increases public good provision in equilibrium depends neither on the distribution of voters' preferences, nor on the magnitude of cross-border spillovers, nor on the relative size, e¢ ciency, or bargaining power of each country. Instead, it depends only on the curvature of the demand for the public good, and on the degree of substitutability between countries' contributions. In the canonical case of a pure public good whose demand has a constant tax-price elasticity, cooperation increases the level of public good if and only if this elasticity is greater than two.
The model further reveals that whether cooperation increases public good provision does not depend on how severe the underprovision of the public good is in the noncooperative equilibrium. For instance, greater cross-border externalities, or allowing for transfers between countries moves the e¢ ciency frontier farther away from the noncooperative equilibrium. However, once voters'incentives are taken into account, greater spillovers or monetary compensations do not make cooperation more likely to be bene…cial.
To understand the intuition behind these results, consider voters'incentives in the electoral stage. Voters trade o¤ electing a public good lover to increase public good provision, versus electing a public good skeptic to shift the cost of provision on the other country.
As the elasticity of the public good demand decreases, the cooperative level of public good becomes less sensitive to the representatives'type, so the latter a¤ect mostly how the cost of provision is shared among the two countries. As a result, voters put a greater weight on reducing their share of the cost of provision, relative to increasing the level of public good, and thus appoint a representative with a lower demand for the public good. This explains why a more inelastic public good demand makes cooperation less likely to be bene…cial.
Likewise, greater spillovers increase the gains from cooperation in the policy-making stage, but require greater contributions from countries, which increase voters'incentives to elect a low demand representative and shift the cost of provision on the other country. The latter, electoral e¤ect o¤sets the former, direct e¤ect, which explains why greater spillovers do not make cooperation more likely to be bene…cial.
Our results can be related to the empirical literature on the demand for public goods.
Interestingly, existing estimates of the tax-price elasticity vary greatly between public goods (see, e.g., Feldstein 1975 , Brooks 2007 ). Hence, our results imply that the e¢ ciency of interjurisdictional cooperation can di¤er importantly across types of public goods. Moreover, estimated elasticities are typically smaller than two (Wildasin 1989 , Auten et. al. 2002 .
Therefore, this model suggests that for plausible speci…cations, strategic voting can severely o¤set the gains from Coasian cooperation between sovereign democracies. Hence, stronger forms of cooperation are required, such as pooling of sovereignty, or explicit cost sharing.
Our results also shed light on the debate over the structure of federal systems. Several competing principles have been invoked to determine the optimal allocation of policy responsibilities between central and local governments. One of them, "cooperative federalism," states that federal policies should be negotiated by and "agreed to unanimously by the elected representatives from each of the lower tier governments" (Inman and Rubinfeld 1979) . Our analysis suggests that cooperative federalism is not an adequate solution for the provision of local public goods with spillovers, and more coercive forms of centralization are needed. Moreover, contrary to received wisdom (Oates 1972) , whether cooperative federalism dominates decentralization depends neither on the heterogeneity of local preferences nor on the magnitude of externalities, but on the elasticity of the demand for the public good.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 describes the pure public good model. Section 4 derives the main results. Section 5 analyzes the case of local public goods with spillovers. Section 6 considers the robustness of the results to a number of extensions, and Section 7 relates the results to the empirical literature on the demand for public goods.
Related Literature
Since Olson (1965) , the literature on collective action and public good provision has shown that the ine¢ ciency of noncooperative behavior is more severe-and thus the potential gains from cooperation are greater-when spillovers are large (Oates 1972 , Sandler 1998 ), when countries' contributions are closer substitutes (Hirshleifer 1983 ), or when preferences are homogeneous (Cornes 1993 ). In contrast, in our model, the distribution of spillovers and preferences do not matter, and cooperation is more likely to be bene…cial when countries' contributions are closer complements. This paper di¤ers from that literature in that the latter focuses on the coordination failure between policy makers while this paper assumes that policy makers cooperate e¢ ciently, and focuses instead on the coordination failure between voters of di¤erent jurisdictions. and show that strategic voting leads to an in…nite amount of public bad as spillovers become global. The discrepancy between our results and theirs comes from the fact that they focus on symmetric equilibria, which exists only when spillovers are su¢ ciently small, so their
result cannot be applied to the case of global spillovers. In Section 6.4, we show that once asymmetric equilibria are considered, their model yields the same results as ours.
This paper departs from the aforementioned contributions in that we focus on the empirically more relevant case in which international cooperation is carried out without monetary transfers, and political leaders stay in place in case of negotiation failure. More importantly,
we consider a large class of public good environments, and characterize the conditions under which strategic voting makes cooperation detrimental. Our analysis singles out the elasticity of the demand for the public good as the main driver of the cost of strategic voting. Even though this parameter has received a lot of attention in the empirical literature (see Section ). These models di¤er from ours in that cooperation is carried out through federal institutions, …scal arrangements, and/or majoritarian decision making. In contrast to the case of voluntary bargaining, these forms of cooperation generate electoral incentives that lead to overprovision. Common …scal pools induce voters to elect public good lovers to increase central spending in their preferred public good. Majoritarian decision making leads to expropriation by the winning coalition, and thus induces voters to elect representatives that are biased in favor of the public project so as to be included in the winning majority.
A Pure Public Good Model
We consider an economy composed of two countries. Each country c 2 f1; 2g is inhabited by a continuum of residents indexed by a set I c . A voter i 2 I c in country c is denoted by (i; c) : Each country c chooses the level of provision x c 0 of a public good, and …nance this provision by national taxation. For expositional purpose, in this section, we …rst present the model in the canonical case of a pure, global public good: for a given vector of provision x = (x 1 ; x 2 ), the level of public good consumed by the residents of either country is g = x 1 + x 2 .
Preferences and the Demand for the PublIC Good
The preferences of each voter (i; c) are parametrized by a type p i;c 0 and are derived from the following utility function:
The term G (x 1 + x 2 ) in (1) corresponds to the utility she derives from public good consumption, while the term p i;c x c captures the utility loss due to the extra tax she pays to …nance her country's provision x c : We assume that G is twice continuously di¤erentiable on R ++ , and for all g > 0,
Note that the parameter p i;c allows for several sources of heterogeneity. It can capture how much voter (i; c) enjoys public good consumption relative to what she consumes with her after tax income, but also how much she contributes to the cost of public good provision relative to other tax payers in country c, or how e¢ cient her country c is in collecting taxes and using the receipts to provide the public good.
The representative of each country c is selected among its population, and its type is denoted by p To illustrate our results, we occasionally use the following speci…cation for G: for all g > 0 and all " > 0 such that " 6 = 1;
and G = ln when " = 1. The public good demand induced by (2) is D (p) = p " . Hence, its tax price-elasticity is constant and equal to ".
Some remarks about the speci…cation in (1) are in order. It is general in some respects and restrictive in others. It is general in that it places minimal assumptions on the public good technology G: More precisely, it allows for any continuous and decreasing public good demand function D. As we shall see, this degree of freedom turns out to be the crucial one in our model. This speci…cation also allows for any degree of preferences heterogeneity within and across countries via the type distribution. Moreover, di¤erences in aggregate tax price R i2Ic p i;c across countries can re ‡ect di¤erences in population sizes, or in taxation and public good provision e¢ ciency.
The speci…cation in (1) is restrictive in two main respects. First, the term G (
in (1) assumes that countries make perfectly substitutable contributions to a pure public good, and this public good induces the same demand function in both countries. These assumptions are relaxed in Section 5. Second, the term i;c x c in (1) implicitly assumes that preferences are quasi-linear in after-tax income and that the tax price of each individual is constant over the relevant range of public good levels. This assumption can be viewed as a …rst order approximation which is justi…ed if the cost of provision of the public good under consideration is a small share of the total budget of each country. Also, this assumption makes our results more comparable with the existing literature, since all papers on strategic delegation and public good provision consider quasi linear environments. Nevertheless, to investigate the impact of tax distortions or preferences that are nonlinear in after tax income, we relax that assumption in Section 9.
The Elections
To focus on the role of elections as delegation mechanisms, and abstract away from other electoral e¤ects such electoral competition or political agency, we model national elections via a simpli…ed "citizen-candidate" model as in Persson and Tabellini (1992) . Representatives are selected from the pool of voters, and any voter is willing to become the representative of her country if she receives a majority of votes. Candidates cannot make credible electoral promises (Alesina 1988) . Therefore, once elected, policy makers maximize their own utility.
Voters are consequentialist and rational: they care only about the policy outcome and foresee how the type of their representative a¤ect the policy outcome. To abstract away from the issue of voters'miscoordination, we assume that the election winner in a given country is the citizen who is preferred by a majority of voters to any other candidate. 4 The following remark implies then that the national median voters are pivotal in all elections. Depending on the nature of the public good, voting on the type of the representative can be interpreted as choosing a candidate with a particular belief about the intrinsic value of the public good (e.g., a global warming skeptic, or a monetarist in the case of …scal stimulus), a special inclination towards the polluting industry or the environmental lobbies, or a candidate who seek the support of voters from a particular income group, and thus from voters with a particular tax price. We …rst derive the subgame equilibrium in the policy-making stage. For any pro…le of representatives p r elected in the …rst stage, the noncooperative policy equilibrium is:
and if p r 1 = p r 2 , there is a continuum of equilibria, but our results do not depend on which is selected in that case. Since public good contributions are perfect substitutes, (3) shows that the contribution of the high-demand representative completely crowds out the contribution of the low-demand representative, and the latter free rides in equilibrium.
Solving by backward induction, the equilibrium in the electoral stage is de…ned as follows: Note that Proposition 1 implies that political representation changes the nature of the game between the two countries: it turns a public good game with a unique equilibrium into a delegation game with multiple equilibria which is reminiscent of the "hawk-dove" game:
both countries want to free ride, but if one country, say 1, commits to elect a su¢ ciently low demand representative (the hawkish strategy), the best response of country 2 is to elect its median voter (the dovish strategy) and let country 1 free-ride.
Does Cooperation Increases Public Good Provision?
Can international cooperation mitigate the free-riding problem that arises in the NEE? Cooperation helps policy makers internalize externalities, which increases public good provision.
However, cooperation requires greater contributions from countries, which exacerbates voters' incentives to elect low-demand representatives and shift the cost of provision on the other country. The latter e¤ect decreases public good provision.
To assess the relative strength of these two e¤ects, we modify the game analyzed in 
where c 2 [0; 1] is the bargaining power of country c, with 1 + 2 = 1. Solving by backward induction, the equilibrium of the electoral game is de…ned as follows:
De…nition 2 A vector of types p r is a cooperative electoral equilibrium (henceforth CEE) if
, and for all p 2 2 R + ,
Remark 1 implies that a CEE is a Nash equilibrium of the game in which median voters control the type of their representatives p r , and whose outcome is x B (p r ).
A few remarks about the way we model cooperation are in order. First, even though countries cooperate, they remain sovereign in that representatives are elected by their respective electorate, policies are …nanced at the national level, and the cooperative outcome leaves both representatives better o¤. Second, the Nash bargaining solution used in the second stage captures the unstructured and voluntary nature of Coasian cooperation between leaders of sovereign nations. We consider alternative forms of cooperation in Section 6.2
and allow for side-payments in Section 6.1. Finally, the bargaining default x N (p r ) implicitly assumes that elected representatives stay in power in case of negotiation breakdown, which is consistent with the observation that in practice, reelections are rarely held on the ground that representatives failed to reach an agreement. 6 The next proposition states our main result. It compares public good provision in the CEE and the NEE. Before stating the result, note that from Proposition 1, public good provision may vary across NEEs depending on which country elects the high-demand representative. To make the comparison more meaningful, we consider pairs of equilibria in which the same country elects the high-demand representative in the CEE and the NEE. Remark 2 in the appendix shows that when countries have similar bargaining power, this assumption is without loss of generality.
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Proposition 2 In any CEE, each country elects a representative whose type is lower than the type of its median voter, but no country completely free rides.
If D denotes the public good demand function derived from G (see Section 3.1), then for all p m , , for any pair of CEE and NEE in which the same country elects the high-demand representative, the level of public good is greater (smaller) in the CEE than in the NEE when
Proposition 2 states that cooperation reduces free-riding in that it forces both countries to make positive contribution, but it increases public good provision only when jD 0 (p)j decreases faster than 1=p 3 , or equivalently, when D (p) is "more convex"than 1=p One can readily apply Proposition 2 to any parametrized family of public good technology such as the isoelastic one, as speci…ed in (2) . In that case, jD 0 (p)j p 3 = "p 2 " , so Proposition 2 implies the following.
Corollary 1 If the public good demand has a constant tax-price elasticity, in the electoral equilibrium, cooperation increases public good provision if and only if this elasticity is greater than 2 (in absolute value), irrespective of the distribution of preferences and bargaining power. To understand the intuition behind these results, note that the extent to which strategic voters o¤sets the gains from cooperation depends on their incentives in the electoral stage.
When choosing their representatives, voters trade o¤ electing a high-demand type to increase public good provision, versus electing a low-demand type to shift the cost of provision on the other country. Corollary 1 states that the relative weight that voters attach to these two con ‡icting goals is driven by the tax-price elasticity of the demand for the public good.
To see why, consider the case in which the public good demand is very inelastic. In that case, the level of public good in the cooperative scenario is insensitive to the type of the representatives, so the latter a¤ects mostly how the cost of provision is shared among the two countries. As a result, voters put a greater weight on reducing their share of the cost of provision, relative to increasing the level of public good. This electoral calculus leads them to appoint a low-demand representative, which decreases public good provision in the cooperative scenario. As the demand for the public good becomes more elastic, the level of public good becomes more sensitive to the type of the representative, so voters put a greater weight on increasing the level of public good in their electoral trade-o¤, which limits their incentives to strategically delegate to a low-demand representative. In contrast, as shown by Proposition 1, in the noncooperative scenario, voters'incentives are independent of the tax-price elasticity.
To conclude this section, observe that our results characterize the impact of cooperation on public good provision. In Section 6.3, we show that under some conditions, the same results hold for the impact of cooperation on social welfare.
Local Public Goods with Spillovers
The model introduced in Section 3 assumes that countries make perfectly substitutable contributions to a pure and homogeneous public good. To investigate the role of these assumptions, in this section, we assume instead that each country provides a distinct public good whose bene…t partially spills over to the other country. Formally, for any country c 2 f1; 2g ; if c 0 denote the other country, the utility function of a voter (i; c) is given by
where G The NEE and the CEE are de…ned as in Section 3 (see De…nitions 1 and 2). Let us …rst consider the noncooperative scenario. For a given pro…le of representatives p r elected in the …rst stage, the subgame equilibrium in the policy-making stage is
Equation (6) shows that policy makers do not internalize the cross-border externalities 1;2 and 2;1 ; but contrary to the homogeneous public good case, since countries contributions are not perfect substitutes, the contribution of the high-demand representative does not crowd out the contribution of the low-demand representative. Note also that from (6), in the policy-making stage, the contribution chosen by a representative is una¤ected by the type of the other representative. Therefore, in the electoral stage, voters have no incentive to strategically delegate, and the unique NEE is p r = p m .
The following proposition determines the condition under which the CEE improves on the NEE.
Proposition 3 For all c 2 f1; 2g ; if D c denotes the public good demand function derived from G c (see Section 3.1), then for all p m , , and , the level of public good c is greater
Proposition 3 states that cooperation increases the equilibrium level of public good c only when jD 0 c (p)j decreases faster than 1=p 2 , or equivalently, when D c (p) is "more convex" than 1=p. Hence, cooperation is bene…cial under qualitatively similar circumstances in the homogeneous and heterogeneous public good models. This similarity is somewhat surprising in that the public good technology is quite di¤erent in the two environments, and it leads to qualitatively di¤erent noncooperative policy equilibria-compare (3) with (6). Nevertheless, Propositions 2 and 3 show that in both environments, once voters'incentives are taken into account, the impact of cooperation is driven mostly by the curvature of the demand for the public good. For the isoelastic speci…cation in (2), Proposition 3 implies the following.
Corollary 2 If the demand for public good c 2 f1; 2g has a constant tax-price elasticity, in the electoral equilibrium, cooperation increases the provision of public good c if and only if this elasticity is greater than 1 (in absolute value), irrespective of the distribution of preferences, bargaining power, and spillovers.
The most noteworthy implication of Proposition 3 and Corollary 2 is that the impact of cooperation depends neither on the magnitude, nor on the symmetry of the spillovers.
This result might seem counterintuitive, because the greater and the more unilateral the spillovers, the less e¢ cient the noncooperative equilibrium (see, e.g., Sandler 1998), and thus the greater the potential gains from cooperation. The intuition for that result is that when spillovers increase, the internalization of externalities induced by cooperation increases Note that in the heterogeneous public good model, the parameter " in the isoelastic speci…cation (2) also determines the degree of substitutability between countries'contributions.
Hence, Corollary 2 states that cooperation is more likely to be bene…cial when countries'contributions are closer substitutes. This result contrasts with the …nding of the collective action literature that the coordination failure is more severe with an additive supply aggregation technology-i.e., when countries contributions are perfect substitutes-than with the weakest link technology-i.e., when countries contributions are perfect complements (Hirshleifer 1983 ).
In the intermediate case in which the demand for the public good has a constant tax-price elasticity equal to 1-that is, when G ln-one can fully characterize the CEE.
Proposition 4 If G c ln for all c 2 fl; rg, there exists a unique CEE. In the CEE, the contribution of either country is the same as in the NEE.
Note that Proposition 4 implies that once electoral incentives are taken into account, the contribution of each country is independent of the allocation of bargaining power :
The intuition for this result is as follows. In the policy-making stage, when the bargaining power of a country decreases, its contribution relative to that of the other country increases.
A greater contribution in the policy-making stage increases the incentives of its voters to strategically elect a low demand representatives. When G ln; these direct and electoral e¤ects exactly o¤set each other. For more general speci…cation of G; the equilibrium outcome may depend on ; but the above intuition explains why, as shown by Propositions 2 and 3, does not a¤ect whether cooperation is bene…cial.
Segendor¤ (1998, Proposition 3) considers the special case G 1 = G 2 = exp, 1;2 = 2;1 = 1, and 1 = 2 = 1=2. Given this public good technology G, jD 0 (p)j p 2 = p; which is increasing. So Proposition 3 implies that public good provision is lower in any CEE than in the NEE, but this comparison hinges on this particular speci…cation for G.
Extensions 6.1 Transfers
Side payments are typically bene…cial in bargaining situations because they increase the potential gains from cooperation. In this section, we investigate whether they remain bene…cial Note that in the absence of transfers, the public good is provided by both countries in the Nash bargaining solution. Hence, transfers decrease the average cost of provision, and thus increase the level of public good provision in the policy-making stage. However, as the next proposition shows, transfers do not make cooperation more likely to increase public good provision in the electoral equilibrium.
Proposition 5
The level of public good is greater (smaller) in the CEE than in the NEE under the same conditions as in Proposition 2.
To understand why transfers do not make cooperation more bene…cial, note that in the absence of transfers, when the voters of the e¢ cient country elect a low-demand representative, they shift the cost of provision on the other country, but by doing so, they also increase the average cost of provision. When transfers are available, the latter e¤ect does not arise, because the public good is always provided by the e¢ cient country. Therefore, transfers increase the incentives of voters in the e¢ cient country to elect a low-demand representative.
This electoral e¤ect o¤sets the bene…cial e¤ect of transfers in the policy-making stage.
Note that Proposition 5 does not imply that transfers have no e¤ect on the equilibrium outcome. For instance, for a …xed p 1 ; as p 2 ! 1-that is, as public good provision by country 2 becomes prohibitively costly-the impact of cooperation without transfers is negligible because country 2 has nothing to o¤er to country 1, so the CEE tends towards the NEE.
However, the availability of transfers e¤ectively reduce country 2's cost of provision to the same level as country 1; thereby making cooperation possible irrespective of how large p 2 is. If furthermore jD 0 (p)j p 3 is increasing, Proposition 5 implies that the level of public good in the CEE is lower than in the NEE. So in the case of strong asymmetries, transfers can be socially detrimental. Hence, this model provides one possible explanation as to why transfers are rarely used in international negotiations. 
Alternative Forms of Cooperation
This paper models cooperation between representatives via the generalized Nash bargaining solution. In this section, we discuss whether our results depend on this assumption.
Note …rst that the utility possibility set is convex, and the equilibrium at the bargain 
is the policy vector that maximizes
Despite its analytical tractability, this bargaining solution is inadequate to model unstructured, voluntary negotiations because it violates the participation constraints of the bargaining parties, and it does not take into account the role of the status quo in the allocation of the bargaining surplus. The next proposition further shows that in the basic model of Section 3, this bargaining solution generically leads to the inexistence of a CEE.
Proposition 7 Consider the basic model of Section 3 in which the CEE is de…ned as in De…nition 2 with x U replacing x B . Then for all for which x U is uniquely de…ned (which is generically the case), there is no CEE.
Cooperation and Social Welfare
Our results in Section 4 characterize the conditions under which cooperation mitigates the underprovision of the public good. Intuitively, cooperation should be socially desirable when it mitigates it and socially detrimental otherwise. But since the ideal level of public good of a voter depends on her type, the impact of cooperation on social welfare depend on the distribution of voters' types. Moreover, if the two countries are not equally e¢ cient at providing the public good, cooperation can also a¤ect the average cost of provision of the public good. However, when the two countries are equally e¢ cient, and when the distribution of voters' preferences within each country is not skewed, the following proposition shows that cooperation is socially bene…cial whenever it increases public good provision, and thus 
Public Bads
Some international negotiations attempt to reduce the production of a public bad rather than increase the provision of a public good. To investigate how our results adapt to this case, we consider the following variation of the basic model of Section 3. Each country c 2 f1; 2g chooses the level of consumption/production x c 0 of a good (e.g., energy), where x c is measured in terms of the average utility gains from the consumption/production of that good in country c: A vector of production x of this good generates a quantity of public bad (e.g., pollution) b = x 1 + x 2 . The utility of a voter (i; c) is
where B is such that B 0 > 0; B 00 > 0, lim x!0 B 0 (x) = 0, and lim x!1 B 0 (x) = +1. The NEE and CEE are de…ned as in Section 4.
If country c was the sole producer/consumer of the good, and if individual (i; c) could decide its level of per capita consumption, the resulting level of public bad would be x c = (B 0 ) 1 (1= (p i;c ) ). Therefore, in the hypothetical situation in which voter (i; c) can produce this public bad via a cost function B and sell it at a price p i;c ; then S $ (B 0 ) 1 can be viewed as her supply function.
The following proposition shows that, similarly to the public good case, cooperation is bene…cial if and only if the supply function is su¢ ciently concave, or equivalently, if the marginal disutility of the public bad increases su¢ ciently rapidly.
Proposition 9 For all p m and , and for all CEE and NEE in which the same country elects the high-supply representative, the level of public bad is smaller (greater) in the CEE than in the NEE when p ! S 0 (p) p 3 is decreasing (increasing).
Note that when S has a constant elasticity " > 0-that is, when B (g) =
and thus 
Tax Distortions
The models analyzed in Sections 3 and 5 assume that for each voter (i; c), the tax price for the public good p i;c is independent of x c . This assumption could be violated if the tax levied to …nance the public good generates distortions which grow more than proportionally with the level of taxation.
Increasing marginal tax distortions can be most easily introduced in the heterogeneous public good model by replacing the term p i;c x d in (5) by p i;c T (x c ) for some strictly increasing and convex function T : 
Equilibrium Existence
Propositions 2 and 3 hold for any CEE, but do not prove the existence of such equilibria.
Existence of an electoral equilibrium in the cooperative scenario is di¢ cult to ascertain because for the general speci…cation considered in (1) and (5), the Nash bargaining solution does not have a closed-form solution, which makes it di¢ cult to verify that voters' payo¤ are quasi-concave in their representatives'types. Nevertheless, Proposition 4 shows that in the heterogeneous public good case, when G ln-i.e., when the demand for public good has a tax-price elasticity equal to 1-a CEE exists for any distribution of bargaining power, spillovers, and types.
For general speci…cations of the function G, one can prove the existence of a CEE in mixed strategies in the heterogeneous public good model. Suppose that voters are expected utility maximizer with Bernouilli utility function given by (5) . A mixed CEE consists of two probability distributions 1 and 2 over R + such that for each c 2 f1; 2g ; any representative's type p r c in the support of c is majority-preferred in country c to any other type, given the probability distribution c 0 of the type p r c 0 elected in the other country. Hence, De…nition 2 corresponds to a mixed CEE with degenerate distributions 1 and 2 . 13 The following proposition extends Proposition 3 to mixed CEE. 
Concluding Remarks
It is instructive to relate our results to the empirical literature on the demand for public goods. Most empirical studies have found a relatively small tax-price elasticity of the public good demand, typically lower than one (see, e.g., Wildasin 1989) but estimates greater than two have been found for some particular public goods (see DelRossi and Inman 1999).
Together with Corollaries 1 and 2, these studies suggest that strategic voting can greatly undermine the gains from interjurisdictional Coasian cooperation, but its e¢ ciency can vary substantially across types of public goods.
It should be noted that most of these estimates are for local public goods. Tax-price elasticities for global public goods are more di¢ cult to estimate because the e¤ect of institutional or cultural di¤erences across countries is harder to factor out from the variations of public good demands. For public goods of national of international scope, existing estimates are based on individual donations. They are not equivalent to tax-price elasticities, because charitable donations re ‡ect a desire for warm-glow which is of smaller magnitude when individual contributions take the form of mandatory taxation. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that, as for the case of local public goods, these estimates are typically around or below one (see, e.g., Auten et. al. 2002 , and the references therein), and more importantly, they vary greatly between public goods (Feldstein 1975 , Brooks 2007 ).
When empirical estimates of tax-price elasticities are not available, our results suggest the following rule of thumb: the negative e¤ect of strategic voting on international cooperation is more severe for public goods whose marginal return decreases more rapidly. Policy expertise can then be used to assess this rate of decrease for a given public good, say fundamental research, disease eradication, or global warming.
Appendix
To keep the algebra tractable, it will be convenient to renormalize the utility function in (1) as follows: or equivalently,
The left-hand side of the above inequality is negative when 
The level of public good at
Using Notation 1, the marginal e¤ect of the representatives' types on the welfare of their median voters is 8 <
:
for some t 2 (
Proof. From (4), B ( r ; x) is concave in x, so x B ( r ) is characterized by the F.O.C. @B=@x = 0, which can be rewritten as follows: for all c 2 f1; 2g,
which implies that
Dividing (13) by c = c r ; x B and substituting (14), we obtain (
; 0 . Using (11) , this implies that
Substituting the above relations into (14), we obtain
Note that (11) and ( 
, so di¤erentiating (10) and simplifying, we obtain
From the mean value theorem, G D
. Substituting the latter equality into the above two equations, we obtain 8 <
Using ( 
Substituting (16) into (17), we obtain (12).
Proof of Proposition 2.
Let r be a CEE, and assume w.l.o.g. that (12), this implies that
Since is positive, we see that 
which shows that median voters elect lower types than themselves.
The following remark justi…es the assumption in Proposition 2 that the same country elects the high demand representative in the NEE and in the CEE. Proof. Let r be a CEE. As argued in the proof of Proposition 2, w.l.o.g., we can assume
in the above equality, we obtain
The fraction on the right-hand-side of the above inequality is bounded away from 0 in a neighborhood of 1 = 1=2. This implies that when 1 and 2 are su¢ ciently close to 
Step 1: For all , we obtain that at r ; x B ( r ) ,
Since B is strictly concave, the term in bracket on the left-hand side of (20) is positive, as needed.
Step 3: for all r 2 R 2 ++ , 
and 8 <
Using (22), the F.O.C. @B=@x = 0 that characterizes x B ( r ) is:
14 Since it is quite intuitive, the formal proof of this comparative statics is omitted for the sake of brevity.
It is available from the author upon request.
Di¤erentiating (22) and using (21), we obtain
Using (23), the above expressions evaluated at r ; x B ( r ) becomes
Di¤erentiating (22) and using (21) and
, we obtain
Using (23) and 1 ( r ; x)
x 1 , the above expressions evaluated at
From (25),
Using successively (23) and (24), the above expression evaluated at r ; x B ( r ) becomes
Di¤erentiating (22) and using
Using successively (23) and (26), the above expression evaluated at r ; x B ( r ) becomes
Using (27) and (28), we get that at r ; x B ( r ) ,
If we substitute (24) and (25) on the right-hand side of the above equation, after simpli…ca-tion, we obtain:
Note that
, and since (D 1 (1=u)) 0 = 1 (u) u, the mean value theorem implies
for some t 2 ( r 1 ; 1=G 0 1 (x 1 )). Therefore, (29) can be simpli…ed as follows:
From (23),
, so the denominator on the left-hand side of (30) is positive. Therefore, the numerator has the same sign as the right-hand side of (30) . Since 1 + 2 = 1 and r 1 < t < 1=G 0 (x 1 ), this implies that
is decreasing (increasing), which proves step 3.
Proposition 3 follows then immediately from steps 1 to 3 and De…nition 2.
Proof of Proposition 4. Proof. Suppose by contradiction that Remark 3 is false. Then there exists a sequence n ! 1 such that for all n 2 N; n < 1 and there exists a symmetric CEE for = n , which we denote ( ( ) ; ( )).
As shown in Buchholz et al (2005) , the CEE ( ( ) ; ( )) must satisfy their …rst order condition (12) . As shown in the proof of their Proposition 4, this implies that ( ) 1 2 m ; and thus that ( n ) ! 0: At a symmetric CEE, transfers are equal to 0 and the policy vector must satisfy their …rst order condition (6), which yields
Therefore, the welfare of i m 1 in the CEE is 
Note that the solution x B to this program is unique, and is such that x 
From what precedes, U 1 d ; x 
Since lim x!+1 B 0 (x) = +1; x is negligible relative to B (x) as x tends to 1: Since lim t!0 S (1=t) = 1; this implies that the second term on the numerator of (34) 
then (34) holds for some d > 0, so ( ( n ) ; ( n )) cannot be a CEE for n su¢ ciently large.
To conclude the proof, we show that (35) is satis…ed whenever S (p) does not increase exponentially. Note …rst that since S 0 is positive and increasing, The above equation implies that for some r 2 in the support of 2 ; the integrand must be nonpositive, and since @x 
Let r be a CEE such that 
Substituting (37) into (36), we obtain 
The above equation shows that the equilibrium payo¤ of countries 1 and 2 are decreasing and increasing in 1 , respectively, as needed.
The initial assumption 
The comparison of (38) and (40) 
0:
The left-hand side of the above inequality is a polynomial of order two in 
